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has been reached, it is the primary 
responsibility of senior military leaders 
to fight the war in accordance with jus 
in bello norms� Convincingly, through 
historical references and extrapolations, 
Dubik demonstrates that successful 
wars have been won not only on the 
basis of tactical excellence but also on 
the strategic merit that both civil and 
military leaders have provided� Dubik 
insists that just war proponents have 
focused exclusively on the tactical 
dimension of jus in bello, thereby 
omitting the strategic facet of waging 
war, including the necessary public 
legitimation, determination of end-state 
goals, provision of logistical support, 
and preparation for reconstruction�
The five principles laid out—continuous 
dialogue, final decision authority, 
managerial competence, war legitimacy, 
and resignation—presuppose the classic 
benchmarks of proportionality and 
discrimination in jus in bello, but these 
additional five strategic components fill 
in the gap of what is tragically lacking 
in the standard just war formulation� 
When senior civil and military leaders 
fail to optimize strategic coordination 
of war via a dynamic partnership 
involving intense dialogue, the costs 
of war escalate in both economic and 
human-casualty terms, rendering 
those leaders who squandered the war 
efforts morally culpable� Unforgettably, 
General Dempsey in his foreword 
asserts that one of the most important 
and haunting lines from the entire 
book consists of these few words: “The 
difficulty of conditions that may mitigate 
responsibility does not erase it” (p� viii)�
Dubik’s critique is not a replacement 
of Walzer’s ideas defending just war 
but rather an addendum that augments 
the value of strategic planning and 
cooperation between civil and military 
leaders� On reflection, a reader might 
question whether the strategic aspect 
of jus in bello might not exist already, 
to some extent, within jus ad bellum, 
considering military advisement as 
part of the moral calculation of pro-
portionality and probability of success� 
Additionally, the reader might wonder 
whether the acceptable range across the 
military operations continuum would be 
determined best if the strategic dialogue 
and robust collaboration between 
civil and military leadership that Dubik 
champions went on not only as part of 
jus in bello but at every stage of war and 
peace� For instance, the war-waging 
principle of continuous dialogue also 
might apply to jus ante bellum (justice 
before war: strategic planning to shape 
fragile states so as to prevent war), 
jus ad bellum (justice in going to war: 
debating all nonkinetic and military 
options), and jus post bellum (justice 
after war: planning for reconstruction) 
to achieve jus pax (just peace)�
Overall, Dubik’s strategic supplement 
to the category of jus in bello is a 
legacy that posterity will credit respect-
fully to the experience and wisdom of 
a distinguished scholar and warrior�
EDWARD ERWIN
Never Call Me a Hero: A Legendary American 
Dive-Bomber Pilot Remembers the Battle of Mid-
way, by N� Jack Kleiss, with Timothy Orr and 
Laura Orr� New York: William Morrow, 2017� 336 
pages� $26�99�
June 4, 1942, stands out as one of the 
most pivotal moments in American 
naval history� The events of that day 
continue to be analyzed, scrutinized, and 
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debated down to the smallest details� 
However, few authors can speak with 
the authority of Captain Jack Kleiss, 
USN (Ret�)� In his memoir of his naval 
service, Kleiss gives special attention 
to the part he and the rest of Scouting 
Squadron 6 played in the battle of 
Midway� The resulting narrative is 
compelling and offers a new perspective 
on the battle� Most histories of the battle 
try to explain the extended air battle as 
a complete picture, but Kleiss eschews 
this approach� It is his own story that 
the reader follows through the battle, 
with his personal triumphs and tragedies 
sharing the stage with the overall 
description of the desperate victory�
Kleiss was a 1938 Naval Academy 
graduate from Kansas who joined 
Scouting 6 in 1941 after his manda-
tory two years in the surface fleet and 
flight school� His telling of his story is 
authoritative throughout, owing to an 
array of primary resources, including 
his wartime diary, letters, logbooks, and 
unit after-action reports� Although he 
penned his memoir some seventy years 
after Midway, the account is exceed-
ingly detailed and surprisingly candid� 
Kleiss was a lieutenant (junior grade) 
at Midway and served as Scouting 6’s 
second flight commander, directly 
behind squadron commander Lieuten-
ant Earl Gallaher� From that position, 
Kleiss put bombs on target on Kaga 
during the momentous afternoon air 
strike of June 4� Later that afternoon, he 
put his bombs into Hiryu to finish off 
the Japanese carrier force, and he also 
would get a hit on Mikuma on June 6� 
For his actions throughout the battle, the 
Navy awarded Kleiss the Navy Cross�
By telling the story from his perspective 
in the cockpit, Kleiss avoids many of the 
discussions of strategy and operations 
that dominate the historiography of the 
battle� However, he specifically cites 
and particularly disagrees with Walter 
Lord’s Incredible Victory (Harper and 
Row, 1967) as a flawed work that has 
mis-steered the narrative of the battle 
and perpetuates the misperception that 
the remarkable victory was largely the 
product of luck� “I prefer to believe we 
won the battle because we knew our 
stuff just a little bit better than our foes 
knew theirs� If luck played any role at 
all, it came in the fact that a few of us 
pilots lived to fly another day, while 
many others died� Luck determined who 
survived, not which side won the battle” 
(p� 280)� Additionally, Kleiss opposes the 
notion that the victory can be credited 
mostly to the admirals in charge of 
the action, Frank Jack Fletcher and 
Raymond A� Spruance� Kleiss considers 
the plans for the battle to have been 
“overly elaborate” (p� 280) and deems the 
pilots responsible for the victory� Kleiss 
credits the tactical proficiency of the 
aviators and the mental flexibility of the 
squadron leaders and air group com-
manders with taking advantage of the 
situation and delivering a sudden, lethal 
strike—in spite of the admirals’ plan�
If June 4, 1942, stands out to the public, 
it haunts Kleiss and colors the entire 
tone of his retelling of the battle�
“As the twenty-first century dawned, 
the Battle of Midway wouldn’t leave me 
alone� To answer the flurry of questions 
accurately, I had to relive the battle 
over and over again� I had to come 
face-to-face with memories I’d long 
since buried� I had to recall the smell 
of the salt air, the roar of the wind as it 
rushed past my cockpit, the sight of red 
flames coming up from the exploding 
ships, and other such vivid sensations 
for which words will never do justice� 
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I had to summon the faces of friends 
I’d lost and the sadness that tortured 
me as I whiled away the aftermath 
of the battle in my bunk� Today, that 
day—Thursday, June 4, 1942—hovers 
over my shoulder like an annoying 
friend, constantly chirping in my ear, 
‘I am the most important day of your 
life�’ It will not leave me alone” (p� xiv)�
Kleiss’s writing (in which he was 
assisted by Timothy and Laura Orr 
of Old Dominion University and the 
Hampton Roads Naval Museum) is easy 
to read even though it is laced with a 
slew of technical details, along with his 
vivid recollections� Anyone wishing 
to get a better insight into the way in 
which a scouting squadron operated in 
the early part of the war should consult 
this memoir as the first step� However, 
the emotion carried in the pages gives 
the work the weight that a secondary 
source must struggle to provide� It is one 
thing to understand academically the 
meaning of the sacrifice of the torpedo 
bombing squadrons, but it is another 
to read Kleiss’s account of parting with 
his best friend on the flight deck of 
Enterprise, with Kleiss in tears, knowing 
he will never see his friend again�
Never Call Me a Hero challenges the 
narrative of Midway that is dominated 
by the admirals and operational details� 
Kleiss freely admits that his conclusion 
is biased toward the evidence of his 
own experiences� However, the book 
constitutes a remarkably detailed 
and comprehensive account from 
one of the key actors in the events of 
Midway� It stands out as an exceptionally 
well-rounded military memoir that is 
worthwhile for both the general reader 
and the serious student of the battle�
ANDREW J� ROSCOE
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